The Uniform Probate Code\u27s Elective Share: Time for a Reassessment by Waggoner, Lawrence W.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
2003
The Uniform Probate Code's Elective Share: Time
for a Reassessment
Lawrence W. Waggoner
University of Michigan Law School, waggoner@umich.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/389
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Common Law Commons, Estates and Trusts Commons, and the Legislation
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Waggoner, Lawrence W. "The Uniform Probate Code's Elective Share: Time for a Reassessment." U. Mich. J. L. Reform 37, no. 1
(2003): 1-37.
THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE'S ELECTIVE
SHARE: TIME FOR A REASSESSMENTt
Lawrence W. Waggoner*
In this Article, Professor Waggoner proposes reforms to the Uniform Probate
Code's (UPC) treatment of the elective share of the surviving spouse. First, the
Article recommends that the UPC adopt a form of presentation that more trans-
parently reflects the normative theories and empirical assumptions underlying the
UPC's elective share framework. Second, the Article presents demographic data
suggesting that the UPC's current elective share approximation schedule may be
inappropriate for a sizable faction of married couples, those remarrying following
widowhood. Finally, the Article proposes two substantive revisions to the UPC's
election share framework-the first proposal is to lengthen the approximation
schedule; the second is to offer enacting states a deferred community property al-
ternative.
The elective share of the surviving spouse was fundamentally
changed in the 1990 revisions of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC
or Code).' The elective share is the statutory provision common to
most probate codes in non-community property states that protect
a decedent's surviving spouse against disinheritance.
The UPC elective share is now over ten years old, and it is time
for a reassessment. This Article recommends a more direct and
hence more understandable form of presentation and presents
data suggesting that two substantive changes would make the sys-
tem more realistic: one change concerns an adjustment to the
current system and the other adds a provision offering enacting
states an alternative approach. The Appendix follows up by pre-
senting a table that positions the current statute side by side with
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1. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 to -214 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 101-32 (1998).
The revisions had their genesis in John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning
the Spouse's Forced Share, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303 (1987).
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the statute as it would appear in revised form were these sugges-
tions to be implemented.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE ELECTIVE SHARE
The organizing principle of Anglo-American law is freedom of
disposition: the donor's intention is Fiven effect except to the ex-
tent that it contravenes public policy. Dating back to common law
dower and curtesy, public policy has long prohibited a decedent
from disinheriting his or her surviving spouse.3 At early common
law, the decedent's surviving spouse was a distributee of personal
property under the English Statute of Distribution of 1670,4 but
was not an heir to land under the common law canons of descent. '
The widow, instead, was entitled to dower and the widower, if the6
marriage produced issue, was entitled to curtesy. Dower gave a
surviving widow a life estate in one-third of the inheritable free-
hold land that her husband held during the marriage. Curtesy
gave a surviving widower a life estate in all the inheritable freehold
land that his wife held at any time during coverture. The estate in
curtesy arose upon birth of issue. Dower and curtesy have largely
been abolished in the United States and replaced by a statutory
elective share that accrues to the surviving spouse upon the de-
ceased spouse's death.
Although dower and curtesy have largely been replaced by elec-
tive share statutes, elective share law (other than the elective share
of the UPC) is heavily influenced by its common law antecedents,
in that it typically grants a surviving spouse a right to elect one-
third of the deceased spouse's estate, increased in some states to
one-half.7 Unlike its common law antecedents, however, the elec-
tive share usually applies to personalty as well as land. The gender
of the surviving spouse is now irrelevant. The elective share is a full
ownership interest, not merely a life estate.
2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 10.1 (2003).
3. See id. at §§ 9.1-.2.
4. An Act for the Better Settling of Intestates Estates, 1670, 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 10, § 5.
5. See, e.g., THEODORE ET. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
714-15 (5th ed. 1956).
6. See id. at 566-69.
7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 9.1 cmt. d (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 34.1 re-
porter's note no. 15 (1992).
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Elective share law protects a decedent's surviving spouse against
disinheritance, but the theory behind traditional elective share law
has not until recently been carefully developed, perhaps because
the idea of granting such protection seems so intuitive. One plau-
sible theory of the elective share is the marital sharing theory.
Under that theory, marriage is viewed as an economic partnership,
a view that imports a goal of equalizing the marital assets.9 Another
plausible theory is the support theory, that the elective share is a
means of continuing the decedent's duty of support beyond the
grave. The traditional elective share statute implements neither
theory. A fixed fraction of the decedent's estate, whether it be one-
third or one-half, is not coordinated with the partnership or sup-
port theories. Regarding the partnership theory, one-third or one-
half of the decedent's estate might be significantly less than the
amount necessary to equalize the marital assets when those assets
are disproportionately titled in the decedent's name and consid-
erably in excess of the amount necessary to do so when those assets
are already titled equally or are disproportionately titled in the
survivor's name. Regarding the support theory, one-third or one-
half might be significantly less than the amount necessary to satisfy
the survivor's support needs in a smaller estate and considerably in
excess of those needs in a larger estate.
8. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 1, at 306-10. Some have doubted the need
for or desirability of an elective share. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Pennell, Minimizing the Surviving
Spouse's Elective Share, 32 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 900 (1998); Sheldon J. Plager, The Spouse's
Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 681 (1966).
9. The partnership theory in divorce law is explained in the AMERICAN LAW INSTI-
TUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 4.09 cmt. b (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION], in the following
terms:
It makes far more sense to ground an equal-division presumption on the spouse'
contribution to the entire marital relationship, not just to the accumulation of finan-
cial assets. The spousal contribution of domestic labor may not confer an equal
financial benefit, but may have made it possible for the couple to raise children as
well as accumulate property. One spouse may have contributed more than the other
in emotional stability, optimism, or social skills, and thereby enriched the marital life.
Property may be the only thing left at dissolution for the court to divide, but it is not
usually the only thing produced during the marriage. An equal allocation of the
property at divorce might thus be grounded on a presumption that both spouses
contributed significantly to the entire relationship whether or not they contributed
equally to accumulation of property during it.
See also Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79, 112-23 (2001) (analogizing marriage to a close corporation);
Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, On Marital Property, 104 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming
Jan. 2004) (manuscript at 1, 37-43, 52-58, on file with the University of MichiganJournal of
Law Reform) (describing marriage as an egalitarian liberal community).
FALL 2003]
HeinOnline  -- 37 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 3 2003-2004
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Other relevant areas of the law of marriage are based on and
coordinated with both the partnership and support theories. In
the community property states, property law implements the part-
nership theory during the marriage. Family law implements both
the partnership and support theories-the partnership theory
upon divorce through the equitable distribution regimes' and the
support theory through the duty of support during the marriage and
the right to alimony upon divorce.12 Traditional elective share law is
the odd one out.
II. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE UPC's ELECTIVE SHARE
The 1990 UPC represents the first effort to bring elective share
law broadly into line with the partnership and support theories.
Applied to the elective share, the partnership theory suggests that
if the surviving spouse so elects, the survivor is entitled to force a
transfer of the decedent's assets sufficient to equalize the marital
assets. The support theory suggests that the surviving spouse is en-
titled to force a sufficient transfer of the decedent's assets to bring
the survivor's assets up to a predetermined amount deemed to be
at least minimally sufficient for support, should the value of the
survivor's assets be below that amount at the decedent's death.
10. Under the community property system, each spouse owns an undivided half inter-
est in marital/community property, defined as property acquired during the marriage other
than by gift, devise, or inheritance. See ALI PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note
9, at § 4.03; MODEL MARITAL PROP. ACT § 4 (1983) (formerly UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY
ACT), 9A U.L.A. 116 (1998). Property acquired before the marriage and property acquired
during the marriage by gift, devise, or inheritance are not counted in the community (or
marital estate), and so remain separate property. The community property states do not
have elective share statutes, because the marital assets have already been equalized through
the ownership rights that attached during the marriage.
11. The specifics of the equitable distribution regimes vary from state to state regard-
ing the property that is subject to equitable distribution, the factors to be considered, and
the amount of discretion granted to the courts in dividing up that property. Despite the
differences, equitable distribution echoes community property at divorce by implementing
the partnership theory. See ALI PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 9, at § 4.09
cmt. b; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 34.1(1) and cmts. b, c,
and d (1992),
12. Alimony, called "maintenance" in some jurisdictions and "compensatory spousal
payments" in the ALI Principles of Family Dissolution, is generally coordinated with the
divorced spouse's post-divorce needs or reduction in standard of living. Empirical studies
typically find that alimony is awarded in roughly 20% of divorce cases. See ALl PRINCIPLES
OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 9, Reporter's Note to § 5.04, citing BUREAU OF THE CEN-
SUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-23, No. 167, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY:
1987 (1990) (survey indicating that 17% of divorced women reported being entitled to
alimony as a result of their divorce decree).
[VOL. 37:1
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A. Support Theory
The UPC elective share implements the support theory by man-
dating in section 2-202(b) that the surviving spouse end up with a
predetermined minimum amount of $50,000, regardless of the
length of the marriage. In the terminology of the UPC, this is
called the "supplemental elective share." The $50,000 figure is
bracketed to indicate that enacting states could adopt a different
figure without undermining uniformity among the states.
Since this Article does not propose any changes in the supple-
mental elective share, 13 it need not discuss the mechanics of this
part of the UPC system. 14 However, the figure of $50,000 (which,
under the Code, is in addition to the probate exemptions and al-
lowances and to Social Security benefits accruing to the surviving
spouse) 15 is quite inadequate to provide the surviving spouse with16
even a modest means of support and at the very least should be
adjusted for inflation.7
13. No change in form, that is, other than moving the provision for payment from § 2-
209(b) and (c), where it currently appears, to § 2-202(b). The purpose is to make it clear
that the sources for payment of the supplemental elective-share amount are not limited to
the marital estate but are payable generally from the decedent's probate estate and non-
probate transfers to others. As explained in a Comment to the Model Marital Property Act,
"[a]ll marital property and all other property of the obligated spouse is available to satisfy
an obligation of support owed to the other spouse...." MODEL MARITAL PROP. ACT § 8 cmt.
14. The supplemental elective share is explained in the General Comment to UPC Ar-
ticle II Part 2, 8 U.L.A. 93, 93-100 (1998). See also Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Rights in
Our Multiple-Marriage Society: The Revised Uniform Probate Code, 26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
683, 742-46 (1992).
15. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202(c) (providing that "the surviving spouse's homestead
allowance, exempt property, and family allowance, if any, are not charged against but are in
addition to the elective-share and supplemental elective-share amounts"); § 2-208(b) (pro-
viding that the surviving spouse's assets do not include benefits under the Federal social
security system).
16. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. Rv. 21,
56 (1994); Waggoner, supra note 14, at 744 n.157 (1992).
17. The consumer price index in 1990 when the $50,000 figure was adopted was
130.7, and in 2002 (the most recent year available) it was 179.9, an increase of 37.6%. See
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index All Urban Consum-
ers, available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpiai.txt (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). In 2002 dollars, $50,000 adjusted for inflation would
be $68,800.
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B. Partnership Theory
It is one thing to speak of implementing the partnership theory
and another thing to work out a system for doing so. The UPC
Drafting Committee adopted a mechanical system that implements
the partnership theory by approximation. The UPC's approxima-
tion system seeks to establish a system that approximates the results
that would be achieved by a fifty-fifty split of marital assets-
without burdening the system with the costs and uncertainties as-
sociated with post-death classification of the couple's property to
determine which is marital (community) and which is individual
(separate).
Under community law, each spouse from the first moment of
the marriage has a right to fifty percent of the couple's assets that
are acquired during the marriage other than by gift or inheritance.
The hitch, of course, is that in the first moments of the marriage,
little or no such property exists. Growth of each spouse's commu-
nity property entitlement occurs over time as the marriage
continues and property is acquired and accumulated.
How does the UPC's approximation system seek to equalize the
marital assets?"' It is based on the theory that each spouse's fifty
percent share is applied to an upwardly-trending accumulation of
marital assets. The UPC effects that theory rather indirectly and
therefore opaquely, though the theory is not completely disguised.
The General Comment to the elective share explains the theory in
the following passage: "By approximation, the [UPC] system
equates the elective-share percentage of the couple's combined
assets with 50% of the couple's marital assets-assets subject to
equalization under the partnership/marital-sharing theory." The
key part of this explanation is that the schedule (located in section
2-202(a)) sets forth elective-share percentages ranging from zero
percent during the first year of marriage to fifty percent after fif-
teen years of marriage, and applies those percentages to all of the
couple's assets. The schedule is designed to represent by approxi-
mation a constant fifty percent of the marital assets.
In form, therefore, the current UPC's approximation system
does not apply a fifty percent share to an upwardly-trending accu-
mulation of marital assets, but operates the other way around.
18. More precisely, the system grants the surviving spouse the right to an equal share
of the marital assets. In cases in which the survivor already owns more than half of the mari-
tal assets, the system does not grant the decedent's estate a right to force the survivor to
transfer assets to the decedent's estate. The reason is that the elective share is for the benefit
of the surviving spouse, not for the benefit of the decedent's heirs or devisees.
[VOL. 37:1
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Formally, the system does not distinguish between property ac-
quired during the marriage and other property, but compensates
for this informally by applying an upwardly-trending percentage to
the couple's assets whenever and however acquired. After five years
of marriage, for example, the elective-share percentage is fifteen
percent, which is meant to represent fifty percent of the marital-
assets portion of the couple's property. By approximation, this
means that thirty percent of the couple's combined assets are
treated as having been acquired during the marriage and seventy
percent not. After ten years of marriage, the elective-share per-
centage is thirty percent, which in effect treats sixty percent of the
assets as having been acquired during the marriage. After fifteen
years of marriage and beyond, the elective-share percentage peaks
out at fifty percent, which in effect treats all of the assets as marital
assets from that point forward.
III. MECHANICS OF THE UPC's APPROXIMATION SYSTEM
The UPC's approximation system operates mechanically
through the application of the following five steps.
Step one: determine the "elective-share percentage." That percentage is
determined under the schedule set forth in section 2-202(a). Un-
der that schedule, the elective-share percentages range from a low
of zero percent for a marriage of less than a year to a high of fifty
percent for a marriage of fifteen years or more.
Step two: determine the value of the "augmented estate. "Under section
2-203, the value of the augmented estate is determined by adding
up the value of four components, as described in sections 2-204
through 2-207. Those components are:
* the value of the decedent's net probate estate (sec-
tion 2-204);
* the value of the decedent's nonprobate transfers to
others, consisting of will-substitute-type inter vivos
transfers made by the decedent to others than the
surviving spouse (section 2-205);,19
19. One of the items included in the decedent's nonprobate transfers to others is the
value of gifts made within 2 years of death "to the extent the aggregate transfers to any one
donee in either of the two years exceeded $10,000." UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-205(3)(iii) This
provision should be revised to coordinate the amount with the amount excludable from
taxable gifts under I.R.C. § 2503(b), now that the gift-tax exclusion is adjusted for inflation.
For calendar 2004, the excludable amount is $11,000. See Rev. Proc. 2003-85, 2003-49 I.R.B.
FALL 2003]
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* the value of the decedent's nonprobate transfers to
the surviving spouse, consisting of will-substitute-
type inter vivos transfers made by the decedent to
the surviving spouse (section 2-206); and
* the value of the surviving spouse's net assets at the
decedent's death, plus the surviving spouse's non-
probate transfers to others (section 2-207).
Step three: determine the "elective-share amount. " The elective-share
amount is the amount to which the surviving spouse is entitled.
The elective-share amount is calculated by multiplying the aug-
mented estate by the elective-share percentage.
Step four: determine how the elective-share amount is satisfied. Under
section 2-209, the decedent's voluntary transfers to the surviving
spouse-whether by will, intestate succession, or nonprobate trans-
fer-are applied first toward satisfying the elective-share amount.
The surviving spouse's already owned portion of the deemed mari-
tal assets is applied next.
Step five: determine the unsatisfied balance. Only if the sum of the
amounts determined under step four falls below the elective-share
amount is the surviving spouse entitled to an involuntary or forced
share in the amount of the deficiency.
To illustrate, suppose that A and B, both in their 70s, were mar-
ried to each other more than five but less than six years. A died,
survived by B. The value of A's net probate estate is $300,000. Dur-
ing life, A created a revocable inter vivos trust in which A was the
income beneficiary for life, remainder in corpus to A's children by
A's prior marriage. The value of that trust at A's death is $100,000.
A made no nonprobate transfers to B. B's net assets are valued at
$200,000. B made no nonprobate transfers to others.
Step one--elective-share percentage: Under section 2-202(a), the
elective-share percentage for a marriage of that length is fif-
teen percent.
Step two--augmented estate: Under sections 2-205 to 2-207, the
augmented estate is valued at $600,000 (the sum of A's net
probate estate of $300,000; A's nonprobate transfers to oth-
ers-the revocable inter vivos trust-of $100,000; and B's net
assets of $200,000).
1184 (2003). Since the UPC provision is designed to prevent a decedent from making near-
death gifts to deplete the marital estate, the period could be shortened from 2 years to I
year or even 6 months, withoutjeopardizing that purpose.
[VOL. 37:1
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Step three--elective-share amount: The elective-share amount is
$90,000 (calculated by multiplying the augmented estate by
the elective-share percentage).
Step four-apply voluntary transfers and spouse's deemed marital as-
sets first: A made no voluntary transfers to B by will, intestate
succession, or nonprobate transfer. The marital portion of B's
net assets is deemed to be $60,000 (determined under section
2-209 (a) (2)) by multiplying B's net assets by thirty percent).
Step five-unsatisfied balance: In this case, there is an unsatis-
fied balance of $30,000 (the elective-share amount of $90,000
minus the deemed marital portion of B's net assets of
$60,000). Under section 2-209(b), A's net probate estate and
nonprobate transfers to others are liable for this unsatisfied
balance. The system forces an involuntary transfer from A to
B of $30,000 (apportioned proportionately among each re-
cipient of A's probate and nonprobate transfers).
IV. CHANGES IN FORM THAT WOULD MAKE
THE SYSTEM MORE UNDERSTANDABLE
One of my objectives in this Article is to outline a more direct
form of presenting the UPC's approximation system, one that
would make the system more transparent and therefore more un-
derstandable. The recommended form would incorporate three
simple changes. First, the elective-share percentages now set forth
in the schedule in section 2-202(a) would be replaced by a provi-
sion stating simply that the elective share percentage is always fifty
percent. Second, the "augmented estate" would be renamed the
"marital estate." Third, the schedule now located in section
2-202(a) would be moved to section 2-203 and the percentages in
that schedule would be doubled. The schedule, as relocated in sec-
tion 2-203, would provide that the marital estate in a marriage that
20. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-209(b) (providing that "[t]he decedent's probate estate
and that portion of the decedent's nonprobate transfers to others are so applied that liabil-
ity for the unsatisfied balance of the elective-share amount or for the supplemental elective-
share amount is equitably apportioned among the recipients of the decedent's probate
estate and of that portion of the decedent's nonprobate transfers to others in proportion to
the value of their interests therein."). At its meeting in December 2002, the Joint Editorial
Board decided that the word "equitably" should be deleted from this sentence because it
has caused confusion in some enacting states.
FALL 2003]
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has lasted fifteen years or more is one hundred percent of the sum
of the four components described previously: (1) the decedent's
net probate estate, (2) the decedent's nonprobate transfers to oth-
ers, (3) the decedent's nonprobate transfers to the surviving
spouse, and (4) the surviving spouse's net worth. In a marriage
that has lasted less than fifteen years, the schedule would provide
that the marital estate is a percentage of the sum of these amounts,
the percentages in each category being double the percentages
now provided in section 2-202 (a).
The primary benefit of these changes is that the statute, as re-
vised, would present the approximation system in a direct rather
than indirect form, adding clarity and transparency to the system.
Returning to the illustration given earlier, in which A and B were
married to each other more than five but less than six years, and A
died, survived by B, we see that the revised system would entail the
following steps.
Step one--elective-share percentage: Under revised section 2-202,
the elective-share percentage is fifty percent of the marital es-
tate (regardless of the length of the marriage).
Step two-marital estate: Under revised section 2-203, the mari-
tal estate is valued at $180,000 (the sum of thirty percent of
A's net probate estate of $300,000; A's nonprobate transfers to
others-the revocable inter vivos trust-of $100,000; and B's
net assets of $200,000).
Step three-elective-share amount: The elective-share amount is
$90,000 (calculated by multiplying the marital estate by fifty
percent).
Step four-apply voluntary transfers and spouse's marital assets first:
A made no voluntary transfers to B by will, intestate succes-
sion, or nonprobate transfer. The marital portion of B's net
assets is $60,000 (thirty percent of B's net assets).
Step five-unsatisfied balance. In this case there is an unsatisfied
balance of $30,000 (the elective-share amount of $90,000 mi-
nus the marital portion of B's assets and nonprobate transfers
to others of $60,000). Under section 2-209(b), A's net probate
21. See infra Appendix. The schedule in revised § 2-203 provides that during the first
year of marriage none of the couple's property is marital property. A surviving spouse of a
decedent who died during the first year of marriage is, however, entitled to the supplemen-
tal elective sharejust as he or she is under the current system as provided in § 2-202(a).
[VOL. 37:1
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estate and nonprobate transfers to others are liable for this
unsatisfied balance. The system forces an involuntary transfer
from A to B of $30,000.
The revised system still assumes by approximation that the cou-
ple's combined assets of $600,000 are in a 30/70 ratio, but the
process for determining that division is more direct. Revised sec-
tion 2-203 provides directly that thirty percent of the couple's
assets ($180,000) is deemed to be marital assets subject to equaliza-
tion and seventy percent ($420,000) is deemed to be separate or
individual assets not subject to equalization. Since the marital as-
sets are deemed to be thirty percent of the combined assets, that
same percentage is applied to each individual's assets respectively.
Consequently, A is deemed by approximation to own more than
fifty percent of the marital assets and B is deemed to own less than
fifty percent. Of A's $400,000 in assets, thirty percent ($120,000) is
deemed to be marital, and of B's $200,000 in assets, thirty percent
($60,000) is deemed to be marital. Since the combined marital
assets equal $180,000, each party is entitled to fifty percent
($90,000). In order to bring A's marital assets down to $90,000 and
B's marital assets up to $90,000, B has a right under the revised
system to force an involuntary transfer from the recipients of A's
net probate estate and nonprobate transfers to others of $30,000.
V. MARRIAGES AND REMARRIAGES
Although there is an infinite variety of marriages, three domi-
nant types recur in society that bear most importantly on elective
share policy. The three are first marriages, remarriages occurring
after divorce, and remarriages occurring after widowhood. To get a
picture of these types of marriages, Table 1 provides a snapshot of
marital status across different age ranges:
FALL 2003]
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The picture that emerges from Table 1 is that troubled or failed
marriages of young or middle age couples are far more likely to
end in divorce than death. Only a small percentage of men and
women are widowed by the mid-50s or early 60s. The shaded areas
in the table show that the incidence of divorce for men and
women is in double-digit percentages between the ages of 35 and
64 for men and between ages 35 and 69 for women, whereas wid-
owhood does not reach double digit percentages until age 70 and
up for men and age 60 and up for women. It is no stretch to say
that the mid-30s to the mid-to-high 60s are predominantly the di-
vorcing years, not the years of disinheritance at death. Note also
that Table 1 likely understates the prevalence of divorce because
some of the men and women listed as "married" have been previ-
ously divorced or widowed and are counted as married because• 22
they have remarried.. Also, men and women listed as divorced or
widowed are candidates for remarriage, but they are also candi-
dates for divorce following remarriage.
Potential elective share claims arise on death, however, not on
divorce. Data are available on the median length of first
marriages, remarriages occurring after divorce, and remarriages
occurring after widowhood that end in death, not divorce. The
starting-point comes from median ages of men and women at the
date of the wedding. The median end-point comes from the life
expectancy of men and women as of the time when half of such
marriages end with the death of one spouse. In 2000, the median
age at first marriage was 27 years for men and 25 years for
women, up from 23 and 21 years respectively in 1970. While
comparable year-2000 data on post-divorce and post-widowhood
remarriages have not been issued, 1990 data indicate that the
median age of men at post-divorce remarriage was then 37 years
and of women was 34 years, up from 35 and 30 years respectively
in 1970. Likewise, in 1990 the median age of men at post-
widowhood remarriage was 63 years and of women was 54 years,
up from 59 and 51 years respectively in 1970 . Extrapolating
22. See ANDREWJ. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 27 (rev. ed. 1992) ("Re-
marriages have been common in the United States since its beginnings, but until [the 20th]
century almost all remarriages followed widowhood.... [B]y 1987, 91 percent of all brides and
grooms who were remarrying were previously divorced, and 9 percent were widowed.").
23. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: POPULATION
CHARACTERISTIcs No. P20-537 at 9 (2000). See also CHERLIN, supra note 22, at 10 ("(T]he aver-
age age at marriage kept increasing in the 1980s and now is older than at any time in [the
20th] century.").
24. NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 43 MONTHLY VI-
TAL STATISTICS REPORT No. 12 Table 9 (July 14, 1995).
25. Id.
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from the rate of increase from 1970 to 1990, the 1990 figures
could roughly be projected to have risen by one to two years in
each category by year 2000. For easy reference, Table 2 collects
these ages that mark the median starting points for each type of
marriage. Coupled with the data collected in Table 1, the median
starting points for post-divorce and post-widowhood remarriages
suggest that remarriage is more likely for younger-than-average
26
divorcees and widows and widowers.
TABLE 2
MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE, POST-DIVORCE REMARRIAGE,
AND POST-WIDOWHOOD REMARRIAGE
27
MEDIAN AGE MEN WOMEN
AS OF 2000
At first marriage 27 25
At post-divorce remarriage 39 36
(proiected from 1990 data)
At post-widowhood 65 55
remarriage (projected from
1990 data)
Using these median starting points for each type of marriage,
Table 3 focuses on the ending points-assuming that the marriage
ends in death, not divorce. Table 3 gives the percent of men and
women still living as far as twenty-five years out. Since the time of
death of the first spouse marks the relevant ending point for pur-
poses of the elective share, Table 3 also gives the probabilities of
both still living, which predicts the percentage of cases in which
251
one has not yet died.
26. See MATTHEW D. BRAMLET'r & WILLIAM D. MOSHER, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ADVANCE DATA No. 323, FIRST MAR-
RIAGE DISSOLUION, DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE: UNITED STATES, at 9-10 (May 31, 2001) ("The
probability of remarriage is significantly higher for women who were younger at divorce.").
27. The mean ages in each category are not much different. In 2000, the projected man's
mean age at first marriage is 28 and the woman's is 25. The year-2000 projected mean ages for a
man and a woman entering a post-divorce remarriage are 40 and 37, respectively. For a post-
widowhoood remarriage, the mean ages are 63 (for a man) and 55 (for a woman). See NAT'L
CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 24.
28. Of the 17.2 million women age 65 and older living in the United States as of March
1990, 49% (8.4 million) were widowed. Of the 12.3 million men age 65 and older, 15% (1.8
million) were widowed. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SIxTY-FIVE PLUS IN
AM. tbl. 8-6, at 8-22 (1992). See also U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1991 22 ("For elderly men, the likelihood of being
married declines only somewhat until age 85. In 1990, 78 percent of men 65 to 74 years ('young
old') and 71 percent of men 75 to 84 years ('aged') lived with their wives, but only 47 percent
of men 85 years and over ('oldest old') did so. For elderly women, their likelihood of living
FALL 2003]
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with their husbands decreases sharply with age: 51 percent of young-old women, 28 percent of
aged women, and only 10 percent of oldest-old women lived with their husbands in 1990.").
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Table 3 shows that the length of a median post-widowhood remar-
riage is over fourteen but less than fifteen years (interpolated, the
length is 14.4 years). Because Table 3 only covers the first twenty
five years after the median ages upon marriage, the table does not
show the length of a median first marriage or of a median post-
divorce remarriage. Using the same technique employed in Table
3, the length of a median first marriage is 46.3 years and of a me-
dian post-divorce remarriage is 35.1 years. Table 4 summarizes the
median beginning, ending, and length of each type of median
marriage.
TABLE 4
MEDIAN LENGTH OF FIRST MARRIAGES, POST-DIVORCE
REMARRIAGES, AND POST-WIDOWHOOD REMARRIAGES
MEDIAN AGE MEDIAN AGE MEDIAN
AT START WHEN FIRST LENGTH
OF THE Two
DIES
Median First Man age 27 73.3 46.3 Years
Marriage Woman age 25 71.3
Median Post- Man age 39 74.1 35.1 Years
Divorce Remarriage Woman age 36 71.1
Median Post- Man age 65 79.4 14.4 Years
Widowhood Woman age 55 69.4
Remarriage I I I
VI. WHAT THE DATA SUGGEST
The UPC's approximation schedule is premised on the theory
that each spouse's fifty percent share is applied to an annually-
increasing percentage of the couple's assets, starting at zero and
rising gradually until it reaches 100 percent after fifteen years of
marriage. The revision suggested in Part IV is designed to make
this theory more transparent and hence more understandable.
The revised system more transparently presupposes that the per-
centage of marital assets increases with the length of the marriage,
and that after fifteen years of marriage, all of the couple's assets
are deemed to be marital.
[VOL. 37:1
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Overall, in 1990, the UPC Drafting Committee believed the ap-
proximation schedule to be reasonably accurate. The data
collected in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4, however, expose some apparent
weaknesses in the current schedule. An estimate of zero marital
property is correct for the start of any marriage. The question is
whether fifteen years is a realistic point to deem that all of the
couple's assets are marital.
No approximation system can produce a perfectly accurate
measure of the mix of marital and individual property at any par-
ticular point in time in an ongoing marriage. The question is not
whether a fifteen year schedule works out as a reasonably accurate
proxy for the actual mix at every particular point in time during an
ongoing marriage, but whether it does so at the one relevant point
in time-the death of the first spouse. The reasonableness of the
proxy depends largely on when the marriage began and how long
it has lasted when the first spouse died.' At a minimum, it would
seem that the proxy should reach a reasonable result for each type
of marriage of median length.
The principal problem for the fifteen year schedule is not posed
by first marriages or remarriages following divorce, but by remar-
riages following widowhood. In a first marriage typically beginning
in early adulthood, the parties are unlikely to bring much in the
way of individual property into the marriage.30 This type of mar-
riage, at the median, begins during the working years and, if it
does not end in divorce, is projected to last forty-six years, well into
retirement.3' All or almost all of the property accumulated during
the marriage is likely to be marital property.
29. Of course, the death of a spouse means that an elective share claim can be made,
not that it will be made. Death alone does not trigger an actual election by the surviving
spouse. A troubled or failed marriage is more likely to end in divorce than it is in death
coupled with an effort by the deceased spouse to disinherit the surviving spouse. On the
other hand, a surviving spouse even in a successful marriage might make an election in
order to pass on more to his or her children from a prior marriage (children from a prior
marriage on one or both sides exist in many post-divorce remarriages and probably exist in
most post-widowhood remarriages).
30. As the average age at first marriage increases (see supra note 23), the parties will
likely have accumulated some assets, but they may also bring debts such as student loans or
credit-card debt into the marriage.
31. See Table 4. For Social Security purposes, full retirement age is 65 for persons born
in 1937 or earlier. The full retirement age for persons born in 1938 or later gradually in-
creases until it reaches age 67 for persons born in 1960 or later. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.409. The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act made mandatory retirement illegal for most em-
ployees who are age 40 or over. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 631. Exceptions include employees
of firms with fewer than 20 employees (see 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)), partners, directors, and
owners of enterprises (because they are not employees), state employees (see Kimel v. Flor-
ida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66 (2000)), firefighters and law enforcement officers (see
FALL 2003]
HeinOnline  -- 37 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 19 2003-2004
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
The parties to a post-divorce remarriage are, at the median,
about ten years older than the parties to a first marriage. This type
of marriage also begins during the working years and, if it does not
end in divorce, is projected to last over thirty-five years, again well
into retirement in many if not most cases. In the post-divorce re-
marriage, each party is likely to bring some and perhaps fairly
substantial individual assets into the marriage and, from then on,
all or almost all of the property accumulated during the marriage
is likely to be marital property.
The current approximation system is likely to give a reasonably
accurate result for the median first marriage and for the median
post-divorce remarriage. Both types, if not ending in divorce, are
likely to be long-term marriages and most if not all of the couples'
accumulated property is likely to be marital. To be sure, wealth in
any individual case will never accumulate exactly in a linear fash-
ion as the schedule presupposes. But in these types of long-term
marriages, most of the wealth that does accumulate is likely to be
classified as marital rather than individual.
It is true that the UPC schedule does not allow for exemption
from the marital estate of inherited or premarital individual prop-
erty even when it has been segregated and can be easily identified.
There are several justifications for this feature. Most importantly, it
would be unfair :o do the opposite in some cases. To allow segre-
gated inherited or premarital individual property to be exempted
from the system would unfairly disadvantage the spouse whose in-
herited or premarital individual property was not segregated and
cannot be easily identified. In fact, to diminish administrative costs
of post-death classification, community property systems indulge a
presumption that all of the couple's property is marital property.
Thus, a community property regime does not always yield an accu-
rate result because in some cases the presumption is untrue but
cannot be rebutted due to lack of proof.3 4 Over a lengthy marriage,
29 U.S.C. § 623(j)), and executives and high policymakers (see 29 U.S.C. § 631 (c)). For
purposes of qualified pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans, distributions must
begin not later than the required beginning date, defined as April 1 of the calendar year
following the later of the calendar year in which the employee attains age 70 1/2 or the
calendar year in which the employee retires. SeeI.R.C. § 401.
32. See Table 4.
33. The Model Marital Property Act provides that "[a]ll property of spouses is pre-
sumed to be marital property" and § 8(a) provides that all obligations are presumed to be
"in the interest of the marriage or the family," which, as explained in the comment, may be
satisfied from all marital property and from the property of the incurring spouse that is not
marital property. MODEL MARITAL PROP. ACT §§ 4(b), 8(a), 8 cmt. (1983).
34. See RobertJ. Levy; An Introduction to Divorce-Property Issues, 23 FAM. L.Q. 147, 152-53
(1989) (noting, in the context of equitable-distribution law, that "the stronger the presump-
tion [in favor of characterizing all property as marital property], the less likely it will be that
[VOL. 37:1
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moreover, much property that was once individual property is
likely to lose that classification due to commingling, untraceable
,5
exchanges and re-exchanges for other property,' and consump-
36
tion-or even due to the mere passage of time. Unlike their
community property counterparts, married partners in title-based
states are not put on notice regarding the risk involved in not
maintaining good records. After all, when they wed, the parties
expect their marriage to last. 7
The problem with the fifteen year schedule is posed by the me-
dian remarriage following widowhood. The dynamics are different
for this type of marriage, for in this type of marriage there is not
likely to be a significant accumulation of marital property. The
man entering this type of marriage is, at the median, thirty-eight
years older than the man entering a first marriage, and the woman
the spouse who owned nonmarital property at marriage or received some during the mar-
riage will try to trace the property or funds;" and that the weaker the presumption, the
more likely it will be that tracing issues will be litigated.).
35. The American Law Institute's Principles of Family Dissolution provide that property
acquired during marriage in exchange for other property and property acquired on credit
during marriage is presumed to be marital property. ALl PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLU-
TION, supra note 9, at § 4.06.
36. In the Principles of Family Dissolution, the American Law Institute adopted the posi-
tion that individual property, whether individual because it was owned before the marriage
or was acquired during the marriage by gift or inheritance, should over time be recharac-
terized as marital property. The rationale is that as a marriage lengthens, the equities
change:
After many years of marriage, spouses typically do not think of their separate-
property assets as separate, even if they would be so classified under the technical
property rules. Both spouses are likely to believe, for example, that such assets will be
available to provide for theirjoint retirement, for a medical crisis of either spouse, or
for other personal emergencies. The longer the marriage the more likely it is that
the spouses will have made decisions about their employment or the use of their
marital assets that are premised in part on such expectations about the separate
property of both spouses.
ALl PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 9, at § 4.12. Such recharacterization,
sometimes called transmutation, is approved of in Frantz & Dagan, On Marital Property, supra
note 9, at 76-83. The authors approve of treating preexisting property as individual prop-
erty initially but question whether all gifts should initially be individual property. See id. at
69-72, 83-87. Even a critic of this provision of the ALI Principles concedes its validity if
applied over time, the major point of criticism being that the Principles recharacterize indi-
vidual property too rapidly. See David Westfall, Unprincipled Family Dissolution: the American
Law Institute's Recommendations for Spousal Support and Division of Property, 27 HARV. J.L. &
PuB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2004) ("With respect to separate property owned at the time of
marriage, the Reporters' argument for its gradual recharacterization as marital property has
some force ... .") (manuscript at 50, on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law
Reform).
37. See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Per-
ceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 439 (1993).
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is thirty years older.' A widow and widower who marry in late-
middle to older age are likely to come into the marriage with sub-
stantial individual property, typically carried over from their earlier
long-term marriages. From then on, little additional property is
likely to be accumulated during the marriage. These are the near-
or post-retirement years when the parties use the bulk or perhaps
all of their assets or the income produced by their assets for living
39
expenses.
In this type of marriage, the fifteen year approximation sched-
ule in effect recharacterizes (or, less charitably, mischaracterizes)
individual property as marital property, and is likely to be less and
less accurate the longer the marriage lasts. As noted earlier, post-
widowhood remarriages can last a good while. Assuming the man
and woman enter such a remarriage at the median ages of 65 for
the man and 55 for the woman, Table 3 shows that over forty-seven
percent of these remarriages will last at least fifteen years. ° In addi-
tion, to the extent that spouses in this type of marriage tend to
keep their individual assets segregated, the administrative costs of
post-death classification are not likely to be as burdensome as they
would be in a long-term marriage that began during the working
years and extended into retirement. Segregation of individual as-
sets in this type of marriage carries the added benefit of a
diminished risk of inaccurate post-death classification.
This Article presents two possible solutions to the problem for
further consideration and discussion. One is to lengthen the
schedule to twenty or even twenty five-years. 4' The other is to offer
enacting states a deferred community property alternative.
38. See supra Table 2, p. 15.
39. In some community property states, notably California, income from separate
property is separate property. See Cal. Fam. Code § 770.
In 2000, only 19% of males age 65 and older were in the civilian labor force, 97% of
those in the civilian labor force were employed, and 50% of those employed earned $35,000
a year or less. Of females, 63% age 55 to 59, 41% age 60 to 64, and 10% age 65 and older
were in the civilian labor force. In the age 55 to 59 category, 98% of the females in the civil-
ian labor force were employed, 66% earning $35,000 a year or less; in the age 60 to 64
category, 97% of the females in the civilian labor force were employed, 66% earning
$35,000 a year or less; and in the age 65 and older category, 96% of the females in the civil-
ian labor force were employed, 77% earning $35,000 a year or less. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: MARCH 2000 (PPL-147), tbls. 9, 10, 13
(2003).
40. See supra Table 3, p. 16.
41. Another possibility is to construct three schedules, one for each type of marriage.
This is worth considering, but is probably not feasible because a first marriage for one
spouse might be to someone who is divorced or widowed, a post-divorce remarriage for one
spouse might be to someone who was never previously married or someone who is wid-
owed, and a post-widowhood remarriage for one spouse might be to someone who was
[VOL. 37:1
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A. Lengthening the Schedule
The purpose of a lengthened schedule would be to address the
problem of the post-widowhood remarriage without shortchanging
the surviving spouse in the other types of marriages. The current
fifteen year schedule increases at the rate of six percent a year for
the first ten years and at eight percent a year for the remaining five
years. Table 4, below, presents alternative twenty and twenty-five
years schedules following a similar pattern. The twenty year sched-
ule increases at four percent a year for the first ten years and at six
percent a year for the remaining ten. The twenty-five year schedule
increases at the rate of three percent a year for the first fifteen
years, then moves to five percent a year for the next nine years,
and gets a ten percent kick in the remaining year.
TABLE 5
TWENTY AND TWENTY-FIVE YEAR SCHEDULES COMPARED
WITH THE CURRENT FIF-TEEN YEAR SCHEDULE
IF THE UNDER THE UNDER A 20-YEAR UNDER A 25-YEAR
DECEDENT AND CURRENT 15-YEAR SCHEDULE, THE SCHEDULE, THE
THE SURVIVING SCHEDULE, THE PERCENTAGE OF PERCENTAGE OF
SPOUSE WERE PERCENTAGE OF MARITAL ASSETS MARITAL ASSETS
MARRIED TO MARITAL ASSETS WOULD BE WOULD BE
EACH OTHER: IS DEEMED TO BE: DEEMED TO BE: DEEMED TO BE:
Less than 1 year 0% 0% 0%
1 year but less 6% 4% 3%
than 2 years
2 years but less 12% 8% 6%
than 3 years
3 year but less 18% 12% 9%
than 4 years
4 years but less 24% 16% 12%
than 5 years
5 years but less 30% 20% 15%
than 6 years
6 years but less 36% 24% 18%
never previously married or who is divorced. The ages upon marriage of these variations
ran depart considerably from the averages.
42. Other variations are of course possible. For example, the 20- and 25-year sched-
ules could be constructed to increase at an even rate, so that the 20-year schedule would
increase at 5% a year and the 25-year schedule would increase at 4% a year.
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IF THE UNDER THE UNDER A 20-YEAR UNDER A 25-YEAR
DECEDENT AND CURRENT 15-YEAR SCHEDULE, THE SCHEDULE, THE
THE SURVIVING SCHEDULE, THE PERCENTAGE OF PERCENTAGE OF
SPOUSE WERE PERCENTAGE OF MARITAL ASSETS MARITAL ASSETS
MARRIED TO MARITAL ASSETS WOULD BE WOULD BE
EACH OTHER: IS DEEMED TO BE: DEEMED TO BE: DEEMED TO BE:
than 7 years
7 years but less 42% 28% 21%
than 8 years
8 year but less 48% 32% 24%
than 9 years
9 years but less 54% 36% 27%
than 10 years
10 years but less 60% 40% 30%
than 11 years
11 years but less 68% 46% 33%
than 12 years
12 years but less 76% 52% 36%
than 13 years
13 years but less 84% 58% 39%
than 14 years
14 years but less 92% 64% 42%
than 15 years
15 years but less 100% 70% 45%
than 16 years
16 years but less 100% 76% 50%
than 17 years
17 years but less 100% 82% 55%
than 18 years
18 years but less 100% 88% 60%
than 19 years
19 years but less 100% 94% 65%
than 20 years
20 years but less 100% 100% 70%
than 21 years
21 years but less 100% 100% 75%
than 22 years
22 years but less 100% 100% 80%
than 23 years
23 years but less 100% 100% 85%
than 24 years
24 years but less 100% 100% 90%
than 25 years
25 years or more 100% 100% 100%
[VOL. 37:1
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The probabilities are that the average first marriage that ends in
death, not divorce, will last over forty-six years,43 long beyond the
time when the fifteen, twenty, and twenty-five year schedules would
deem all of their assets to be marital assets. Moreover, Table 3
shows that almost ninety percent of the men and women of a me-
dian first marriage that does not end in divorce will outlive their
fifteenth, twentieth, and twenty-fifth wedding anniversaries, again
beyond the time when the fifteen, twenty, and twenty-five year
schedules would deem all of their assets to be marital assets. As
noted earlier, in a first marriage typically beginning in early adult-
hood, the parties are unlikely to bring much in the way of
individual property into the marriage, and all or almost all of the
property accumulated during the marriage is likely to be marital
property. A twenty or a twenty-five year approximation schedule
would therefore seem on average to reach an appropriate result in
this type of marriage.
At the median, a post-divorce remarriage that does not itself end
in divorce" is projected to last over thirty-five years,45 long beyond
the time when the fifteen, twenty, and twenty-five year schedules
would deem all of their assets to be marital assets. According to
Table 3, eighty-five percent will outlive their fifteenth and twenti-
eth wedding anniversaries, when the fifteen and twenty year
schedules would deem all of their assets to be marital assets and
the twenty-five year schedule would deem seventy percent of their
assets to be marital. Over seventy-six percent will outlive their
twenty-fifth anniversary, when even the twenty-five year schedule
would deem all of their assets to be marital assets. Parties to a post-
divorce remarriage are likely to bring some individual assets into
the marriage derived from the property settlement in their previ-
ous divorce4f and, in some cases, one or both parties will bring
substantial assets into the marriage. 47 From then on, all or almost
43. See supra Table 4, p. 18.
44. See BRAMLETr & MOSHER, supra note 26, at 9-11, 13.
45. See Table 4, p. 18.
46. It is well documented that women experience a decline in their standard of living
after divorce and men experience an increase. See, e.g., BRAMLETr & MOSHER, Supra note
26, at 2 ("The economic consequences of divorce can be severe for women .... For men,
the retention of income combined with decreased family size may actually result in an in-
crease in his new household's income per capita.").
47. When one party to a post-divorce remarriage has significant assets and the other
does not, the wealthier one may seek a premarital agreement. See Erika L. Haupt, For Bette,
For Worse, For Richer, For Poorer: Premarital Agreement Case Studies, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
29 (2002); William H. DaSilva, Changing Population Trends Spur New Interest in Prenup Agree-
ments, N.Y. ST. B. J., Feb. 2002, at 8. On the validity of a premarital agreement, see UNIF.
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all of the property accumulated during the marriage is likely to be
marital property. A twenty or a twenty-five year approximation
schedule is likely to be reasonably on the mark in this type of
marriage.
The median post-widowhood remarriage not ending in divorce
is projected to last over fourteen but less than fifteen years, and
over forty-seven percent will outlive their fifteenth wedding anni-
versary, when the fifteen year schedule deems all of their assets to
be marital assets, the twenty year schedule would deem seventy
percent of their assets to be marital, and the twenty-five year
schedule would deem forty-five percent of their assets to be mari-
tal. Over twenty-six percent will outlive their twentieth anniversary,
when the twenty year schedule would deem all of their assets to be
marital and the twenty-five year schedule would deem seventy per-
cent of their assets to be marital. Ten percent will outlive their
twenty-fifth anniversary, when even the twenty-five year schedule
would deem all of their assets to be marital. Since a post-
widowhood remarriage is unlikely to produce much marital prop-
erty, especially if both spouses are retired or otherwise
unemployed, a twenty or a twenty-five year approximation sched-
ule is likely to be closer to the mark than the current fifteen year
schedule, though even these longer schedules are likely to overes-
timate the percentage of marital assets, less so for the twenty-five
than the twenty year schedule.
Conceding the likelihood that the approximation system will
overestimate the amount of marital property in the median post-
widowhood remarriage (even under a twenty or twenty-five year
schedule), that does not necessarily mean that the UPC system
produces a manifestly unjust outcome. The more equally divided
the individual assets are, the less claim the surviving spouse will
have to an involuntary transfer out of the decedent's assets. The
survivor's claim would be even smaller if the approximation
schedule were stretched out from the current fifteen years to
twenty or twenty-five years.
To illustrate how the different schedules would apply to the me-
dian post-widowhood remarriage, suppose that a widower was age
65 and a widow was age 55 when they decided to get married. Both
were retired or otherwise unemployed and both had adult chil-
dren by their prior, long-term marriages. One died survived by the
other 14.4 years after the wedding. At the decedent's death, the
couple's combined assets were valued at $1 million. For the sake of
PROBATE CODE § 2-213; UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 (1983); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.4 (2003).
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argument, assume that during their marriage, this couple used
their retirement income for living and medical expenses and ac-
cumulated nothing significant in the way of marital property.
Consider three cases: In Case 1, the decedent's assets were
$500,000 and the survivor's assets were $500,000. In Case 2, the
decedent's assets were $550,000 and the survivor's assets were
$450,000. In Case 3, the decedent's assets were $600,000 and the
survivor's assets were $400,000. Assume in each case that the indi-
vidual assets were segregated and easily identifiable as individual.
Consequently, under a community property regime, the survivor
would have little or no claim on the decedent's assets. By contrast,
under traditional elective share law, which does not seek to equal-
ize the marital assets but instead grants the surviving spouse one-
third of the decedent's estate, the survivor could take $166,667 in
Case 1, $183,333 in Case 2, and $200,000 in Case 3. For compari-
son, the following tables indicate how these cases would be worked
out under the UPC approximation system using the current fifteen
year schedule, and alternatively using the proposed twenty and
twenty-five year schedules depicted in Table 5.
CASE 1
CURRENT UPC 20-YEAR 25-YEAR
15-YEAR SCHEDULE SCHEDULE
SCHEDULE (64% DEEMED (42% DEEMED
(92% DEEMED MARITAL) MARITAL)
MARITAL)
Decedent's deemed $460,000 $320,000 $210,000
marital assets
Survivors deemed $460,000 $320,000 $210,000
marital assets
Deemed marital $920,000 $640,000 $420,000
estate




Less Survivor's $460,000 $320,000 $210,000
deemed marital
estate
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CASE 2
CURRENT UPC 20-YEAR 25-YEAR
15-YEAR SCHEDULE SCHEDULE
SCHEDULE (64% DEEMED (42% DEEMED
(92% DEEMED MARITAL) MARITAL)
MARITAL)
Decedent's deemed $506,000 $352,000 $231,000
marital assets
Survivor's deemed $414,000 $288,000 $189,000
marital assets
Deemed marital $920,000 $640,000 $420,000
estate




Less Survivor's $414,000 $288,000 $189,000
deemed marital
estate




CURRENT UPC 20-YEAR 25-YEAR
15-YEAR SCHEDULE SCHEDULE
SCHEDULE (64% DEEMED (42% DEEMED
(92% DEEMED MARITAL) MARITAL)
MARITAL)
Decedent's deemed $552,000 $384,000 $252,000
marital assets
Survivor's deemed $368,000 $256,000 $168,000
marital assets
Deemed marital $920,000 $640,000 $420,000
estate




Less Survivor's $368,000 $256,000 $168,000
deemed marital
estate
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The greater the discrepancy between the decedent's assets and
the survivor's assets, the greater the discrepancy there will be be-
tween the outcome under the UPC and a community property
48regime. For example, if the decedent's assets were $700,000 and
the survivor's assets were $300,000, the survivor's claim would rise
to $184,000 under the current fifteen year schedule, and would be
$128,000 under the twenty year schedule and $84,000 under the
twenty-five year schedule. In many cases of this type of post-
widowhood remarriage, however, the discrepancy between the de-
cedent's individual assets and the survivor's individual assets will be
diminished by how the UPC's approximation system treats benefi-
cial interests in trust. Suppose that the decedent was the income
beneficiary of a trust created by his or her predeceased first spouse
and that the survivor was the income beneficiary of a trust created
by his or her predeceased first spouse. Upon the decedent's death,
no part of the value of the trust would be included in the marital
estate, but the commuted value of the survivor's income interest
would be included.49
Bear in mind also that when there is a sizeable discrepancy in as-
sets coming into this type of marriage, the likelihood increases that
there will be a premarital agreement that waives or reduces the
50)surviving spouse's right to an elective share, perhaVs strongly en-
couraged by the adult children of the wealthier one.
48. Alan Newman, who favors a deferred-community elective share, begins his article
with an illustration in which the deceased spouse's assets were twice as valuable as the surviv-
ing spouse's assets. See Alan Newman, Incorporating the Partnership Theory of Marriage into
Elective-Share Law: The Approximation System of the Uniform Probate Code and the Deferred-
Community-Property Alternative, 49 EMORY L.J. 487, 487-88 (2000) [hereinafter Incorporating
the Partnership Theory]. By the same token, the older the widow and widower were at the time
of marriage, the smaller will be the discrepancy between the outcome under the UPC and a
community property regime. Suppose, for example, that the widower were 70 and the
widow were 68 when they got married, and that the first died over nine but less than ten
years after the wedding. In Case 2, the survivor would be entitled to claim $27,000 under
the current UPC 15-year schedule, $18,000 under the 20-year schedule, and $13,500 under
the 25-year schedule. In Case 3, the survivor would be entitled to $54,000 under the current
UPC 15-year schedule, $36,000 under the 20-year schedule, and $27,000 under the 25-year
schedule.
49. It would not matter whether these were marital deduction trusts, whether power of
appointment or QTIP, or credit shelter trusts. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-205 and 2-207.
50. See supra note 47.
51. See ALI PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 9 § 7.05 cmt. e ("One
common motivation for entering into a premarital agreement is to protect children of a
prior relationship..."). As the financial columnistJane Bryant Quinn noted, "[When older
people remarry, y]our friends will be enchanted, but don't be surprised if your children
aren't. It's usually not the 'pater' they worry about, but the patrimony."JANE BRYANT QUINN,
MAKING THE MOST OF YOUR MONEY 82 (2d. ed. 1997).
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B. A Deferred-Community Property Alternative
In seeking to implement the partnership theory of marriage, the
UPC Drafting Committee considered another possible approach-
to grant the surviving spouse a right to take an elective share based
on the amount to which he or she would be entitled under a
community property system . Although the UPC Drafting Com-
mittee decided to adopt the approximation system described
above, they were not opposed to providing a deferred-until-death
community property alternative for enacting states that prefer that
method of implementing the partnership theory. The drawback of
such a system is that the current version of the statute is not con-
ducive to providing such an alternative. In the current version, the
elective share percentage is intertwined with the mechanism for
separating by approximation the marital from the individual prop-
erty. The revised version proposed in Part IV solves this problem.
By making the elective share percentage a flat fifty percent of the
marital estate, the proposed revision disentangles the elective
share percentage from the approximation schedule, thus allowing
the marital estate to be defined either by the now-doubled ap-
proximation schedule or by the deferred-community-property
approach. Although one of the benefits of the revised version is
added clarity, an important byproduct of the proposed revision is
that it facilitates the inclusion of an alternative provision for enact-
ing states that prefer a deferred-community approach. The
53
Appendix contains such an alternative provision.
The advantage of the approximation system is that it avoids in-
curring the administrative costs of post-death classification that
would burden a deferred-community elective share. Under the de-
ferred-community approach, the surviving spouse would have a
52. The UPC Drafting Committee also briefly considered but quickly dismissed a third
approach-to use the equitable distribution system of divorce law, that is, to extend that
system into marital dissolution at death. The idea was rejected because the discretionary
and hence unpredictable nature of that system is unpopular among the probate bar. Also,
unlike the divorce context, where both parties are still alive and can testify, only the survi-
vor's side of the story can be told in the case of a disinheritance. For a proposal to adopt an
equitable-distribution model for the elective share, see Angela M. Vallario, Spousal Election:
Suggested Equitable Reform for the Division of Property at Death, 52 CATH. U. L. REv. 519 (2003).
53. Because the UPC is a uniform act, the community property model would normally
have to be derived from the definition of marital property in the Uniform Marital Property
Act ("UMPA"). Now that the UMPA has been downgraded to a Model Act by the Uniform
Law Commission (see supra note 10), the MMPA definition would not be obligatory in the
UPC, though it could still serve as a possible definitional source. Other possible definitional
models are surveyed in Newman, Incorporating the Partnership Theory, supra note 48, at 531-
[VOL. 37:1
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right to claim an amount equal to a fifty percent share of the cou-
ple's marital assets-that portion of the couple's combined assets
that were acquired during the marriage other than by gift or in-
heritance. The disadvantage of the deferred-community approach
is that it would require post-death classification of the couple's
property to determine which is marital (community) and which is
individual (separate). The tradeoff is that an approximation system
does what its name implies-it approximates. Measured against the
partnership theory of marriage, an approximation system will
hardly ever be exactly on the mark in any individual case, and can
be far from the mark in a number of cases, even were the ap-
proximation schedule to be lengthened from the current fifteen
year schedule to a twenty or twenty-five year schedule.
The UPC approximation schedule is premised on the theory
that the marital assets in a marriage start at zero and increase an-
nually according to a predetermined schedule. Starting at zero is
correct for every marriage, but it is a false premise that marital as-
sets in every marriage gradually increase to 100 percent fifteen
years later, or twenty or twenty-five years later. This is because the
actual mix of marital versus individual assets at any particular time
in a marriage depends on a variety of factors that may be more im-
portant than the length of the marriage. More important factors
include how much individual property each spouse brings into the
marriage, how much individual property each spouse acquires dur-
ing the marriage by gift or inheritance, how much marital property
is accumulated during the marriage, and how much of individual
versus marital property is segregated or otherwise easily identifi-
able, and how much of each class is used for consumption and how
much is retained.
It seems apparent that no approximation system can estimate
these and other relevant factors to produce an accurate measure of
the mix of marital and individual property in any particular mar-
riage at any particular point in time. As noted earlier, the question
is not whether the UPC system using only the length of the mar-
riage works out as a reasonably accurate proxy for the actual mix at
any particular point in time during an ongoing marriage, but
whether it does so at the relevant point in time-at the death of
the first spouse. This depends largely on when the marriage began
and how long it had lasted when the first spouse died. Tables 2, 3,
and 4 predict the average length of first marriages, post-divorce
remarriages, and post-widowhood remarriages not ending in di-
vorce, and also predict the percentage of men and women still
FALL 2003]
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living at each age following the wedding. But these predictions are
based on median starting and ending times. They are still only
medians and probabilities. By definition, half of the men and half
of the women will enter each type of marriage at a younger age
than the median ages used in Table 2 and half at an older age.
About half of each type of marriage will last longer and half will
not last as long as the probable ending points identified in Table 4.
Even if most marriages in each category cluster close to the me-
dian (a proposition for which no data are available),5 there will
always be some that differ materially from the median. An enact-
ing state that feels uncomfortable with the approximation system
would be free to adopt the deferred-community alternative.
CONCLUSION
This Article has outlined a revision in the form of the UPC's
elective share system that, if adopted, would add transparency and
clarity to the system. It has also raised the possibility of extending
the schedule such that only in marriages lasting longer than 20 or
25 years would all of the couple's property be deemed marital.
The Article has also noted that an important byproduct of the
revised form is that it facilitates the inclusion of an alternative pro-
vision for enacting states that prefer a deferred-community elective
share instead of the approximation system that the UPC currently
employs. In making that choice, enacting states should balance the
equities of the two approaches. In a long-term marriage that be-
gins during the working years and extends into retirement, the
approximation system is likely to produce a reasonably accurate
result and save considerable administrative costs of post-death clas-
sification. In a late in life marriage that begins near or after
retirement, the administrative costs of post-death classification are
likely to be mitigated and the approximation system is more likely
to deem property as marital property even though it is provably
individual property. That mischaracterization, however, is less
likely to produce manifestly unjust results measured against the
partnership theory of marriage in shorter than average marriages
54. Note, however, that the mean ages differ little from the median. See supra note 27.
55. A first marriage that differs materially from the median because one spouse died
prematurely will seldom implicate the elective share. A failed first marriage is more likely to
end in divorce than disinheritance at death (see Table 1), and most young persons who die
prematurely die intestate, not with a will disinheriting the surviving spouse. See Waggoner,
supra note 14, at 745-46.
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or in marriages in which the value of each party's individual prop-
erty is more equal, even though such property is deemed by the
approximation system to be marital property.
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